国防工程智能信息系统效能评估研究

在简要介绍国防工程智能信息系统组成和功能的基础上,提出了系统效能评估指标体系,分别用BP神经网络和AHP法建立了国防工程智能信息系统效能评估模型,并对系统的设备监控管理能力进行了评估。仿真结果表明,BP神经网络法克服了传统评估方法精度低、模型复杂和计算量大的缺点,可将以往的专家经验知识进行分析学习,能够实现实时方便的在线评估;AHP法对多层次的指标体系具有较强的处理能力,但是存在指标权重确定主观性强,计算量大的问题。     

Can Smart Defense work? A suggested approach to increasing risk- and burden-sharing within NATO

“Smart Defense” is NATO's new approach to risk- and burden-sharing, which has been a chronic problem within the alliance since the 1950s. Numerous solutions have been proposed, but initiatives resulting in more equitable burden-sharing have never been fully implemented. There are two driving forces influencing a county's willingness to support such initiatives – the economic theory of alliances and the risks posed by the implementation of capability sharing. The authors examine each of these and propose that rather than aiming for group consensus on the production of capabilities, NATO should focus on interoperability through support functions. This approach provides the most likely solution for connecting the forces, doctrine, procedures, standards and other factors of joint capability production such that country leaders find the risks of doing so to be politically and militarily acceptable.     

China's Global Equity Oil Investments: Economic and Geopolitical Influences

In this article, we construct and analyze an original database of overseas Chinese equity oil investments (EOI) in order to assess the relative importance of economic and geopolitical factors in determining the type of countries that are most likely to receive those investments. We find that China's national oil companies (NOCs) choose to make considerable investments in certain oil rich countries while ignoring others. We develop and examine ‘economic opportunity’ and ‘geopolitical relevance’ explanations of Chinese EOI. The economic explanation assumes that Chinese oil companies operate autonomously despite the fact that they are state owned, and that they seek international experience in countries offering less competition but more risk. The geopolitical explanation suggests that Chinese equity oil investments are developed and coordinated by the central government as part of a geopolitical strategy that is designed to bypass the so-called ‘Malacca Dilemma’ and deepen security ties with oil-rich states through the conduct of oil diplomacy. We argue that Chinese EOI tends to reflect both corporate interests and government priorities, and that it generates more liabilities rather than benefits for China.     

Israeli foreign policy and the arms race in the Middle East 1950–1960

Previous accounts of the arms race in the Middle East during the 1950s have focused on the imbalance that resulted from the ‘Czech deal’ of September 1955. While that transfer of weaponry by the Soviet Union to Egypt constituted both a historical turning point and sharp acceleration of the arms race, it was only one of several changes in the regional strategic balance of that decade. This article makes extensive use of archival material in order to identify five phases of the arms race of the 1950s and analyze the manner in which Israeli policy‐makers dealt with the exigencies of procurement during each phase. Except for a brief period following the arms deals with France in 1956 that marked the beginning of the fifth phase examined below, the Israelis never abandoned the attempt to obtain arms from the United States. Israel's success in maintaining a high degree of independence in foreign policy throughout this period was the result of arms purchases from Britain and France that marked each phase of the arms race examined here. Yet, the Israelis considered arms from both of these Western powers to be temporary substitutes for the arms relationship with the USA that came about during the 1960s.     

Operation ‘enduring freedom’: a victory for a conventional force fighting an unconventional war

The track record of the US military in unconventional wars has not been good and there were fears that Operation ‘Enduring Freedom’ might suffer the same fate as previous campaigns. This contribution explores why the Taliban were defeated so easily by the US in 2001. It challenges the view that America's victory was due solely to changes in its modus operandi or that the outcome heralds a change in the fortunes of the US when fighting unconventional war. It also questions the idea that America's victory was a consequence of Taliban incompetence. Instead, it explains the defeat of the Taliban in terms of the prevailing political conditions within Afghanistan, which made them vulnerable to attack. The essay concludes that current political circumstances could, in the long run, permit the resurrection of the Taliban and undermine the US-led coalition's victory.     

仿真教学优化《现代生物技术概论》课程教学模式的探讨

本文在分析现代生物技术课程特点和多媒体仿真教学及优点的基础上,阐述了利用仿真教学法在《现代生物技术概论》课程教学的优化模式,通过实践证明仿真软件在教学上具有实际应用价值。     

Country survey XVI the defence sector in the economy of a declining superpower: Soviet Union and Russia, 1965-2001

The Soviet Union was able to develop a large military-industrial complex and become the world's second superpower despite deficiencies in its centrally planned economy because defence was given high priority status and special planning, rationing and administrative mechanisms were used to attain national security objectives. However, in the period 1976-85 the effectiveness of priority protection diminished and defence institutions experienced more of the problems typical of the shortage economic system. The heavy defence burden also created growing difficulties for the civilian economy. The attempts by the Gorbachev government to reform the defence sector and improve defence-economic relationships during perestroika (1985-91) uniformly failed. For most of the transition period, the Russian military-industrial complex has been adversely affected by its low priority status, cuts in defence spending, instability of the hybrid politico-economic system, and negative growth of the economy. The armed forces and defence industry have been reduced in size and their outputs of military services and equipment have fallen to low levels. Nevertheless, the Russian armed forces still have over one million troops, significant stocks of sophisticated conventional weapons, and a large nuclear arsenal. The government of President Putin has raised the priority of the defence sector, increased real defence spending, and adopted ambitious plans to revive Russian military power. It is likely, though, that tight resource constraints will hamper efforts to reform the armed forces and to upgrade weapons. By 2010 Russia will be an important, but not dominant, military power in Eurasia.     

Alternatives for defense in the Post‐Soviet World: A guide for economists to the U.S. debate

The defense establishments of all major powers are changing to reflect changes in the foundations of national security strategy and resource allocation. The authors believe economists should play an active role in formulating these changes and offer an orientation to the U.S. debate, presenting three major alternatives: the “Base Force” (Bush Administration), Mr. Aspin's Force “C,” and the “Low” Alternative (Prof. Kaufmann and Dr. Steinbruner). These alternatives are compared using first‐order measures of capabilities, budgets and risk. Budgetary estimates are based on newly‐developed analytical tools.     

A non‐linear defence‐growth nexus? evidence from the US economy

The defense‐growth nexus is investigated empirically using time series data for the US and allowing the effect of defense spending on growth to be non‐linear. Using recently developed econometric methods involving threshold regressions, evidence of a level‐dependent effect of military expenditure on GDP growth is found: the positive externality effect of defense spending prevails for relatively lower levels of defense spending (with respect to the history of defense spending in the US) and reverts its influence for higher levels.     

Chalk vs Guns: Some economic consequences of an announced French scenario 1

This paper explores whether defense contractors' manufacturing technology advantages over purely commercial firms might be associated with differences in their workforce and organizational practices. It uses unique original data collected specifically to test workforce and organizational complementarities in implementation of advanced manufacturing technology in small manufacturers. Findings are that defense contractors: (1) have higher and deeper rates of advanced manufacturing technology use; (2) have greater perceived success in achieving manufacturing goals; (3) are more likely practitioners across a diverse spectrum of advanced workforce and organizational practices. Then, (4) econometrically, the defense contractors' higher reported levels of achievement in implementing advanced manufacturing technologies are positively associated with those organizational and workforce practice differences.